Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a few comments on what Dr. Francis Deng has said, and be as brief as possible. First of all, I find the title of his paper very interesting, stating that "what is not said is what divides." I would also say that although the SPLA has said a lot about what it stands for, people always have a tendency to think what it should be saying, not what is actually said. This is relevant because Dr. Francis made a comment about the fact that the leadership of the movement is addressing national issues and is presenting itself as a movement which is for the interest of the whole Sudan, while the rank and file desire to rid themselves of domination, and there may even be some separatists. I found this to be typical of the current thinking of some Sudanese intellectuals and many Southern intellectuals. And it is so because people tend to make comparisons between this movement and the Anya Nya I. Because this separation between the rank and file and the leadership is only there among non-SPLA members. The fact is that once the war broke out on the 16th of May 1983 there was a lot of debate and discussion, until people reached an agreement in July 1983 about the manifesto. That manifesto was not the decision of the leadership alone. It was a discussion, involving battalions 104 and 105, who were attacked, and the political groups which went and joined them a few days after, and reassembled at the borders between the Sudan and Ethiopia and discussed the issue. It was a real democratic discussion, and agreement on the manifesto was a consensus of opinion which was not something imposed by the leadership on the rank and file. Otherwise it could not have survived the struggle which followed then. I think you are aware of the conflict which arose between the faction of Akout Atam and Gai Tut and the present leadership of the SPLM/SPLA. When it started it was not a question of separation or unity, it was a question of leadership. But all were agreed on the question of the program which had been presented. So I think it is very important to clarify that there is no leadership which is imposing certain stands on the rank and file which think otherwise. But of course in any movement or any struggle, in order for you to have support you must articulate the particular problems which are facing the people. Otherwise, nobody will feel that he has a problem which will make him take the decision to make the ultimate sacrifice of offering his life. This is a real problem we should work hard to fight against.
So the movement started in the south definitely because of subjective conditions which were prevailing there. In addition, and over and above, the objective conditions which are prevailing all over the country. So the South was a ground where some actions had to start. But that again does not mean that it has to be confined to the South. Because similar problems are felt in other places. But the conditions which would create a confrontation had to be there, in addition to what everybody else feels. I think this is a fact which is known by many people. So the message of the SPLM is very simple. It is that, first, we have a multi-national, multi-religious, multi-ethnic country, as has been stated this morning. For such a country to exist, it must first of all accept the equality in the sense we have defined it, and contribution of everybody. This, by necessity, involves the question of trying to reach a national consensus which is devoid of things which divide us, like religion. This is a fact, because even our experience in Africa and the Third World has shown that countries can survive despite religious differences. In Africa we have the case of Nigeria where you have had both Muslims and Christians taking power, although statistically you would say that the majority of people in Nigeria are Muslims. We have the case of Senghor [in Senegal], when he left power. He was a Christian, he was replaced by a Muslim. In the case of Tanzania where you had a Christian who was ruling, who was replaced by a Muslim. You can go to India, where in 40 years you had more than three Muslim presidents in a country of which the majority are Hindu, and a very, very small minority of Muslims. Questions of religion do not by themselves per se disunite people. Take the case of India and Pakistan. At independence in 1948 Jinnah agitated on this question of having Pakistan as a separate country because he was Muslim. But what happened in the 70's? Even Islamic Pakistan could not maintain its unity, because it had to divide itself into Bangladesh and Pakistan, despite the fact that both are Muslim. Indeed, what we are saying is that this religious aspect could not be the only factor which unites a country. It is one of the things which makes a country run, and therefore you give each individual the freedom to adhere to his own beliefs. But we as a nation agree on things which unite us. This is one of the messages the SPLA say. The second thing, which we also say, is that in this multi-national situation, let us have a way of agreeing on national laws, which we'll abide with and which guarantees everybody's rights. Then, local ordinances for those who feel strongly for their own religion, for their own cultures. They can decide on their role. I had the privilege of being one of the people who were in the meeting between Dr. John and Sadiq [John Garang and Sadiq el Mahdi] in 1986, and my friend Bagadi [Dr. Hamad Omar Bagadi] was also there. This aspect was discussed very seriously, and we said that we in the SPLA have no problem agreeing that national laws are secular, and regional laws could have a religious content. I stand to be corrected if this was not the exact situation which we discussed. So again we say that we have a national government which involves everybody, you should have to have consensus on things which don't divide us. Things which are personal law, and if you can identify an entity within Sudan which is absolutely Muslim, then they can decide on their own laws. Whether they want to make them Muslim or not is up to them. But these are local ordinances which would not have the strength of the law of the nation. This is some of the aspects which again should be discussed because it is very important. The question of powersharing, what sort of framework do you need to make equitable power? We believe that we need a country which is ruled on a regional basis. A big country like Sudan, with all the multiplicities involved could not be a unitary system. This is an obvious fact. But we don't have hard views on that. It must be a self-autonomy, or it must be federalism, or it must be what? It is something which we will agree upon in the conference, that is, what sort of content we would need to give this regional setup. We are very flexible about it, and we believe that it should be developed out of a consensus of all the Sudanese to agree on this particular form or that. But what is important is the sense of stressing what unites and what divides. We are seriously and sincerely committed to the unity of the country because we believe that countries are not what they are because they are monolithic, either in terms of religion or in terms of culture or in terms of climate. If these examples of history are not enough, then we will stand to be informed by people who think otherwise, that the country should disintegrate because of such differences. A third point is the question of language. People have also been talking about the question of Arabic and other languages. We also believe that there must be a chance for all the cultures to develop. Now you have Radio Omdurman, if you listen to it, it is like Radio Saudi-Arabia or any other monolithic country. It starts from 6 am up to quarter to twelve midnight and the whole thing, from the beginning to the end, is in Arabic. This particular aspect of stressing one culture is definitely one of the problems which could also be solved through regionalization, in the sense that if you had regions which had their own radio and television stations they can express their own identity within this media and then the general media could be reserved for everybody. Arabic is a language which is accepted in Sudan. I don't quarrel with Arabic as a language because you stand to gain by learning a language. But what is not acceptable is the question of tying Arabic with Arabic culture and Islamic content. In Sudan people tend to believe that Arabic and Islam are inseparable. We also give examples that we have cases of other countries that have a language and which leave the other aspects out. You have America, the US, that was colonized by the British. They left a language there, which is now the official language in the country, but the Americans had to fight the British to get their independence. Why? Because they believe they are a separate people, and the language had nothing to do with their lives, with their self-determination and all these other aspects. We have the case of Latin-America. In Brazil, the Portuguese colonized the country. They left the language, but Brazil is proud of its own culture which developed separately from Portuguese culture. The rest of the countries in Latin America which were colonized by Spain, they now speak Spanish as their official language -the only language. But again, they feel that their cultures, their ways of life, their institutions are separate from what Spain has. They are even different in terms of approaches. So, what we are saying, the SPLA, is that we are a country of diversity, but we believe that these diversities could be overcome if we had a judicious approach to problems, in a way which will tend to stress what unites us, and we leave the small aspects which divide for local arrangements which could also be worked out amicably.
The third point I want to touch is the question about majorities. Again, majorities have always been misleading in the country. People talk of the Islamic majority as an excuse for imposing Islam as the system of the state. Again I should also be very clear that the question of Islam and Christianity and others, as religions, as far as I am concerned, should have the independence to proselytize, to convert as many as they want. There is no problem in that. But our quarrel with religion, is when it is used as a means of state power so as to isolate others from the position of participation. Because definitely, if we have an Islamic state, you could not have a non-Muslim becoming a head of the state; this is out of question. If somebody says otherwise he is trying to deceive others. In an Islamic state also, you could not have a woman becoming a Prime Minister. I am glad now in Pakistan Bhutto is one, although I don't agree with her policies. But the fact that she is there as a Prime Minister in a country which is said to be an Islamic state is a good example and from which I hope our friends in Sudan will learn that in a modern society these dogmatic and old approaches to things cannot be the solution to problems. The question of majorities, when you talk of an Islamic majority, this is artificial, because you can quote other majorities. You can talk of a female majority in the Sudan, you can talk of African majority, statistically, those of African stock are a majority, compared with the others. So you won't stop if you talk about majorities because each will have his own majority which will suit his own interest in order to get to power. What we are talking about is a question of a democratic majority. I should have an appeal, a message, which will unite me with Abdel Ghaffar [Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed] who is from the north, and may be turn me away from Dr. Francis [Francis Deng] who is from the south. Because we believe the old polarization of north-south has tended to harm the general cause of the people, rather than to help in solving problems. It has tended to give the impression that it is Muslims versus Christians, blacks versus Arabized Sudanese, and also other connotations which in fact tended to create more difficulties than help to solve them.
The last point is the question of process. Dr. Francis Deng also has stressed that the people have been stressing the process rather than on the actual, substantive issues. This point is very important, because first of all, why people are stressing the process is because, historically, the question of sticking to agreements has been one of the weakest points in the politics of the Sudan. I think Mr.Eliaba [Eliaba Surur] has talked much about it. Really what people are saying, you even notice this in Koka Dam, you notice it in the last peace initiative between the SPLM and DUP - what people are saying is that first of all you need to have some sort of measures which, if they are implemented, will test the waters for both sides, that some confidence now is being reached before you go to a conference. The discussion of process is in effect rather a way of trying to guarantee the success of the conference, if it is ever held, instead of going to a meeting, which will be definitely bound to fail, and that will harden feelings more and will not be helping the peace process. So, people insist on prerequisites because we believe that it is the only way to guarantee that there has been a change of mind regarding those who are in power. We have incidences of history where people have committed themselves to agreement, that have never been respected. The list can be long. You have mentioned already 1947 when the Civil Secretary promised Southerners that they will be given a special administrative setup, and the case of the voting in the parliament in 1955, on the 19. December, when Southerners were persuaded to vote for independence because there was a promise that the new Constituent Assembly would give consideration to the question of federation. We have the case of the Addis Ababa Agreement [in 1972] - all these sort of things. Even Koka Dam itself is an example which can be quoted now in retrospect, as a case where people also did not respect what they have agreed upon. Sadiq el Mahdi signed Koka Dam when he was not yet in government. But when he became Prime Minister we were surprised that instead of trying to argue about how it is important to implement Koka Dam, instead he was saying that now, since the DUP, which is now part of government, by then, and the National Islamic Front have not signed Koka Dam, then really Koka Dam is out of question. Then we are saying: " But Prime Minister, you are someone who is committed to Koka Dam. You should have worked hard to convince your partners in government to accept what you have already committed yourself to." Then he went into an argument of trying to say that those who went to Koka Dam were really not mandated to sign on behalf of the Umma Party, and that when the Koka Dam came, you were in the process of elections and nobody took a very serious study as to its implications, and all sort of things like this. So confidence building is really the reason why people have been stressing very much on the process, as Dr. Francis has said, because we don't want to go to a conference in which we from the beginning have a feeling that it will be 90% failure rather than the other way around. We want to go to a conference where each of us feels that we will have a 90% chance of success.
Finally, I think what is lacking in Sudan is the question of will on the part of the leaders. We need a sort of statesman who can rise high above his own local self interest, and his own local constituency, in order to take a tough decision which will take the country to the course of peace. Also we can quote examples of history, even in Sudan itself, when [Ismail] Azhari became Prime Minister, the first Prime Minister, Azhari was leading a party that was committed to the unity of the Sudan and Egypt. And the first decision he took was to announce an independent Sudan, despite the fact that he had the majority and could have done otherwise. But as a statesman he came to the conclusion that what the people wanted by then was to have an independent Sudan. He changed overnight and made that decision. This is something counted for him. We have the case of de Gaulle in France. De Gaulle came into power on a platform that Algeria is a part of France. When it came to the crux he had to take a decision. He had to reverse his position and made a decision that now Algeria should be independent, because the circumstances of the situation demanded that. So there is nothing wrong in a politician changing his position, if that serves the national interest. I remember I was in Britain in 1979, when Thatcher came into power, and I had been following her politics before that. She was a very adamant supporter of Ian Smith. She was accusing everybody of letting Ian Smith down the drain, but the first decision she took when she was a Prime Minister was to call for the Lancaster House Conference, and proclaim, or work for independence of Zimbabwe. And this is where Zimbabwe is now. So I believe the issues are clear, as I said. But what is lacking is in fact the will of a statesman who will take a decision to rise above the petty, small self interest. And this has been, I think, reflected clearly in the last peace initiative. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact I have very few comments to make. I actually like the title what is not said is what divides, and if I should start from this title, I think I should say that, yes, our problem as Sudanese is that we are too polite, too polite to each other. At the time we all count our problems, and hear the anger and differences in our own bosoms we do not always put it properly and do not spell it out at the time when we are supposed to do that. And in order, of course, to reach any peaceful solutions and to come successfully out from the dilemma we are in, I think it is all appropriate to call things by their proper names. I want to be specific of what I am referring to. Take for example this conflict between south and north, which Dr. Francis Deng referred to. And always all people talk about the conflict between the south and the north. If we successfully managed to define where south lies, I think we are still up to now far from defining the north. And this reminds me of the comment made by Mr. Eliaba [Eliaba Surur] of what the Prime Minister commented about the war, that the war has not reached our boundary yet. This is really, actually very interesting, and this has always been worrying me. Especially this question of the Nuba. I shouldn't be taken that I am advocating on taking Nuba as this and that, but I am taking it as an example within the general context of this problem of Sudan. Issues always were referred to, our problems were defined geographically rather than taking other things into consideration. Even if we take this question of definition, trying to regard Nubas and others as Northerners in geographical terms. Yes, Nubas speak Arabic; a good majority of them, a sizable majority of them, they are Muslims. They perhaps might be acculturalized in Arabic culture, and I don't know why should they be considered as Northerners. I am not saying that they should be classified as Southerners, but after all why should they go either way? Why should they be either Northerners or Southerners? If we have the choice, should we go automatically to the south, or automatically to the north? And here comes the crisis of identity, mentioned by Mr. Speaker [Dr.Francis Deng]. These things, I think, should be taken into account when you talk about this question of national integration, and trying to take each part, or all bodies, into account by spelling out some of their grievances or identities and giving them a chance at least to choose. Sometimes we know that perhaps the Nubas, you find they are fighting, with the SPLA. You find them fighting on the side of the government, you find them in the government, fighting on the side of the government as soldiers, of course. You find them in the government. And you find others in the opposition, and also others in between. Sometimes, not because they don't know where to go, or are indecisive, but simply because the situation is actually very difficult. And it is made difficult not by their own choice. What I want to say is that sometimes we take things for granted and we try to create situations which might in the end not lead us to a peaceful solution, simply because we are so desperate for peace we disregard some small things which might in the end not lead us to peace at all. This leads me to another point, which many of us refer to as a national consensus. I don't know how possible is this word, achieving such a consensus in this situation. I am not running after this consensus as such as being the very, very thing that we need. But I am running after just a minimum understanding, to have a general thing on which we meet, a starting point of discussions. And then as we go on, perhaps we will be able to develop this question of consensus rather than now to talk about a consensus which I find it very difficult at the moment to reach. I think, Mr. Chairman, now, for the moment, this is all what I wanted to say. I have said that one of the problems that aggravates some of these things is this political marginalization of a greater part of this rural people, like the Nubas. Sometimes we have a problem reaching out and the structure of the thing is revolved over this question of power, and people have to think very carefully. Thank you very much indeed.
