Management of the Crisis in the Sudan. Background papers presented to the conference. A Review of the peace efforts since april 1985

BACKGROUND PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE CONFERENCE

A REVIEW OF THE PEACE EFFORTS SINCE APRIL 1985

Hamad Omar Bagadi

May I take this ample opportunity to thank with great appreciation the Director and the staff of the Centre for Development Studies, Bergen University, for their concern about the Sudan and the Sudanese people and for giving us the opportunity to gather here to enlighten you about the problems of the Sudan as we see them.

Although we are here representing different political parties and groups we would like to assure you that it is not impossible for us to unite at the right time in issues that affect the national unity and sovereignty of this nation. I need not say that peace in the Sudan has remained our goal for the past 40 years.

There have been different attempts to achieve peace settlements throughout those years, but all of these, unfortunately, were not successful, either because they were superficial in substance or there were violations of the terms of those agreements or lack of seriousness in the implementation of these agreements.

If we look at the global and regional politics today, we can see the sudden convergence of interests among traditionally hostile forces to reduce tension by peaceful means in several conflict areas around the world. Ironically, and despite these waves of changes to peace in many countries, the hardening of positions and the escalation of the conflict in our country continue.

My contribution in this meeting is to review the peace efforts embarked on by the government and other political forces in the country since the April 1985 uprising. In doing so, the paper identifies 3 phases which I will discuss in some detail to arrive at a conclusion expressing the present situation of these efforts.

A) Phase I (April 1985 - April 1986)

This phase was a preliminary stage in the peace process following the downfall of Nimeiri`s regime and the formation of the Transitional Military Council (TMC). During this phase four initiatives for peace were undertaken, including a unilateral cease fire (23/5/85, 1/6/85, 25/8/85). These initiatives failed due to a variety of very complex factors which included:

The orientation and the composition of the TMC itself was perceived by the SPLM as a continuation of the May regime since it incorporated most of the top army brass that had served under Nimeiri.
The TMC peace initiatives were designed without any or little consultation with the civilian government (TCM) or other political forces. In addition, the relationship between TMC and TCM as well as the political parties and trade unions was antagonistic, characterized by a widening gap of trust between the two bodies. This situation was known to the SPLM/SPLA and therefore the movement was reluctant to respond favorably.
While all political parties and trade unions considered the SPLM/SLPA as a major force that had contributed to the downfall of Nimeiris regime, the TMC remained prisoner of the view that the SPLM/SPLA was no more than a rebel force and therefore should be dealt with accordingly.
During the same phase, much attention was directed by the majority of the political forces and TMC towards the immediate problems of famine and the stabilization of this new regime. Accordingly, insufficient attention was paid to the realization of peace.

B) Phase II (Oct. 1986 - Oct. 1988)

This phase is considered the most important one and begins with the structural restorations of the democratic system, holding of the general election and formation of an elected government. It is a period which witnessed the intensification of peace contacts with SPLM/SPLA. The real ice-breaking initiative was that embarked on by NANS (14 political parties and 22 Major Trade unions) and which led to the signing of the famous Koka Dam Declaration with SPLM/SPLA on 24/3/1986. Although Koka Dam was signed during the earlier phase, the real benefits of that declaration materialized during this second phase, as it opened the flood-gates for the government, political parties and groups inside and outside the Sudan to pursue the course of peace.

In brief, one can view those efforts within the following perspectives:

a) In a broad sense, government efforts included three initiatives (July 1986, April 1987,: April 1988), in addition to the Prime Minister's meeting with the SPLM on July 1986.
b) Informal efforts: These were spearheaded by NANS in the meeting of the joint: liaison committee with SPLM on May, June and August 1986. In addition, there were efforts by political parties (Umma, DUP, NIF, Communists and USAP).
c) Other non-governmental efforts included the all-party working group in January 1988,: the Wilson Institute meeting in Washington, February 1987, and the Interactive meeting in Harare in March 1988.
d) Third party efforts - included General Obasanjo's efforts in August 1987,: president Moseveni's efforts in September and October 1987.

All the above listed efforts aimed at fostering a conducive atmosphere to convene the proposed constitutional conference as stipulated in the Koka Dam Declaration. However, these intensive efforts failed to bring the conflict to an end. Reasons for that failure are varied but it is important to note the following:

a) Two major political parties namely DUP and NIF, with more than 50% of the seats in: the assembly, were not signatories to the Koka Dam Declaration. This fact made the implementation of the declaration impossible.
b) Since the majority of NANS members did not contest elections, its ability to mould: government decisions on the peace process was eroded.

Bearing in mind the above difficulties and in order to surmount them, the Prime Minister and the Leadership of SPLM/SPLA in their meeting of 30/7/1986 thought it useful to widen the joint liaison committee between NANS and the SPLM/SPLA in order to form the National Popular Committee (NPC) to include both the signatories of Koka Dem and those who failed to contribute to it. The same idea was subsequently taken up by General Obasanjo in his efforts to speed up the peace process.

Despite the intensity of efforts towards peace during this phase, the real agreement remained elusive. Nevertheless, a new consensus started to take shape around the following points:

a) A deep committment to the maintenance of a democratic system as a main guarantee: for a durable peace.
b) The recognition of ethnic plurality and cultural diversity of the Sudanese society: as a base for peace dialogue.

C) PHASE III (November 1988)

The peace process entered its 3rd phase with the signing of the Sudanese peace initiative between DUP and SPLM/SPLA in November 1988. It was in many ways the most important development in the peace process since the Koka Dam Declaration. Although the initiative represents indeed a major step forward in the sense that it showed greater flexibility vis a vis the application of the religious laws and the adopting of the 1956/64 constitution, it has its own shortcomings. How can a government lift the state of emergency when fighting still continues and since armed confrontation in itself is a manifestation of instability and in the final analysis an emergency? Bearing in mind these shortcomings which characterized the importance of Koka Dam, there should have been wider and more intensive consultation in order to ensure the involvement of all the major political forces.

This situation was further complicated by the withdrawal from government of the major force in the new peace initiative - the DUP. Their stay in power would have given DUP greater leverage in the implementation of the terms of the agreement.

Having done that, the DUP deprived itself from the opportunity to influence government decisions directly and thereby weakened the peace process. In order to salvage the initiative, the Umma party, aware of the NIF alienation from the peace initiative, embarked on efforts to ensure consensus. Hence, the Umma party chairman, who is also the country`s Prime Minister, has urged the DUP to consult with NIF and SPLM/SPLA to clarify the fine prints of the Sudan peace initiative. This suggestion is being undertaken by the DUP and has contributed in keeping the initiative alive. It is our hope that the efforts will lead to steps for the adoption of the Sudanese peace initiative by the government.

Conclusion

It is evident from the above discussion of the phases, that progress has been made, admittedly slow, and not parallel to the sense of urgency felt inside and outside the Sudan. Reasons for this delay arise from very complex realities.

After the experience of the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord which was short-lived, there is now greater awareness that the present attempt should aim at a durable and lasting peace. Hence there is greater care, more intense deliberations and efforts for wider consensus which all are time-consuming, and, hence the slow progress in peace.
Secondly, concurrent with these conscious efforts, there is a degree of polarization that has set in on the debate concerning peace.

There is on the one hand the idea that through a peace conference, an accommodation could be arrived at which would preserve the general structure intact, after certain adjustments, such as a Federal or Confederal State which would allow the implementation of Islamic laws in some regions and secular laws in the other.

Together with the legal, structural changes, there would be a negotiated adjustment, in the division of wealth and power. On the other hand, there is the perception that transformation can be realized in the socio-economic and political balance of power through the proposed constitutional conference. In short, it is the realization of radical changes through non-radical means.

Both views, however, are extreme and therefore unreasonable. Both try to realize through dialogue what they have failed to realize through bullets!

The dichotomy at the heart of the polarization mentioned above, presents the struggle for peace with very concrete difficulties and hence the search for a middle ground must dominate the search for a lasting and durable settlement.
Perhaps this middle ground perspective may be based on the accommodation of the desire for change together with the preservation of the democratic structure that the Sudanese paid so dearly to realize. In this sense the desired accommodation of the conflicting views would come through as enactment of the major decisions that people agree upon in the constitutional conference and the inclusion of that agreement in the permanent constitution of the country.

With this perception of a constitutional conference, the gap between the two opposing poles would be bridged. In my view the consolidation of the bridge offers a means to accelerate this holding of the constitutional conference.

3. Thirdly, the Sudan of today is not that of 1972. The ravages of war and its: effects on the socio-political fabric have left deep wounds. The economic infrastructure has suffered accordingly and is showing evidence of weakness and failure to fullfil the basic needs in food, shelter, education, medicine etc.

Such negative developments in the context of a democratic set-up which safeguards the basic rights of expression, association and political organizations, have led to further polarization of views and a near hysteria concerning the deteriorating living standards.

The above 3 generalizations have contributed to the stalemate from which we are suffering at present and which approximate a vicious circle of cause and effect that is becoming increasingly difficult to break. Nevertheless, there are still those of us in the Sudan, within the various political forces, who feel that peace offers the golden key with which we would be able to embark on the realization of stability and development to which we aspire.