Management of the Crisis in the Sudan. Background papers presented to the conference. Mohamed M.A. Salih (fortsettelse)

BACKGROUND PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE CONFERENCE

TRIBAL MILITIAS, SPLA/SPLM AND THE SUDANESE STATE: "NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES"

M.A. MOHAMED SALIH

THE EVIDENCE

Here I present a brief account of the Humr/Ngok Dinka conflict as a case study of the process of retribalization and the shrinking of the modern political arena. A detailed account of this can be found in Deng (1972, 1973, 1978) and Mohamed Salih (1979).

In 1951, five years before the liquidation of the Anglo-Egyptian rule, Deng Majok, the Ngok Dinka Nazir was given the option to either join Bahr el-Ghazal province in the South or to remain the administration of Kordofan in the North. Deng Majok decided that he and his people would remain within the administration of the Kordofan simply because the Ngok Dinka and the Humr were enjoying peaceful relations. The opposition of the Humr to the appointment of Ahmed Deng in 1955 as an executive officer in Abyie ignited a conflict situation between the Ngok Dinka and the Humr. The Ngok Dinka began to reconsider their position and demand separation from the north to join the South. According to Deng (1973, p.55-8), a delegation of the Ngok Dinka Youth Association (under the guidance of Ahmed Deng), was arrested in El Obeid in 1955 when they were negotiating the issue of joining the South. The 1955-1972 war also left its marks on the Humr/Ngok Dinka relationship. After the failure of the Round Table Conference, the war was intensified and the Anya-nya extended their operations to the border with Kordofan and the White Nile Provinces (Beshir, 1969, p.99). When the Anya nya forces attacked Gogrial in 1965 many Humr were killed, an act which led the Humr to retaliate by attacking the Ngok Dinka in Ragaba El-Zarga and Babanusa town (Deng, 1973, p.64).

It was from that time that the conflicts between the Humr and Ngok Dinka-Humr continued and peace conferences to settle such conflicts were held after every major conflict. The most tragic conflict was in May 1977 a few months before I commenced my fieldwork in Abyie. The immediate reason this time was a quarrel between Dinka and Humr youth over water points near Abyie town. The fight spread all over Ngok Dinkaland with the loss of many lives and property. According to South Kordofan police records 100 Ngok Dinka and 33 Humr were killed in the fight.

In September 1977 a conspicuous tribal conference was held in Kadugli in order to reach a peaceful settlement. The whole Government of Kordofan province was there including a delegation from the central Government. After laborious negotiations the two parties reached the following agreement,

"1) The Humr agree to pay 1,400 head of cattle compensation to the Ngok Dinka for death and damage of property, 2) Stolen property should be returned to its respective owners, 3) the two sides agree to hold three conferences every year to monitor the Humr incoming, stay and departure from Bahr el-Ghazal and the southern grazing lands". (A summary of the original agreement quoted in Mohamed Salih (1979, pp.219-22). The successive tribal peace conferences were sponsored by the Government and involved the same tribal leaders who were ousted by the Local Government Act of 1971 after they were accused of corruption, mal-administration and the perpetuation of tribalism. The point to make here is that while the Government's official policy aimed at the abolition of the adherence to tribalism, its appeal to the tribal leaders has, on other hand, strengthened the tribal entities.

Since the Humr are among the tribes which have been directly or indirectly armed by the Government in order to confront possible attacks by the SPLA/SPLM forces or settle some of their old enmities with their neighbouring Ngok Dinka it represents a clear case or retribalization. Again, the creation of the Humr tribal militia has contributed to the reinforcement of the tribal values which I described earlier with reference to the warrior tradition.It is a process of putting new wine in old bottles. In other words, assigning modern roles to traditional tribal institutions.

Owing to the revival of tribal sentiments within the South as a result of the atrocities committed by some tribal groups against the others, the overall situation suggests that there is now less unity among the Southern tribes than ever before. There are more frequent attacks between Southern tribes today than between Southern and Northern tribes alongside the South/North frontiers. This has culminated in the creation of 300,000 refugees living on the borders with Ethiopia, a moderate estimate of 250,000 who already lost their lives and a looming famine which threatens the lives of at least a million, most of whom are children, old men and women.

It is ironic that at the time when the elites fuel the war and rally for foreign support to continue the war, more than a million Southerners have already migrated to the North seeking refuge, peace and food. This increases the number of Southerners living in the North from about two millions before the present war to about three millions, ie. over one third of the total population of the South. While the masses longing for peace and unity are so visible to the naked eye, the lust of the political leadership for more concentration of power and dependence on war as the only solution to the present crisis is unparalleled.

The creation of the tribal militias cannot be justified for, at least, three reasons: first, tribal enmities tend to persist and it will take many decades before the wounds of war will heal. The most important function of the army is its role as a guardian of national unity and, therefore, it should be the only institution entrusted to monopolize that role. Second, the use of arms by civilians is apt to create chaos and a situation of anarchy and this is exactly what is happening in the South today. Third, any indication that the state is weak and cannot afford to defend its citizens is a sign of political and economic crisis. The only way out and the only possibility for the state to save its face is peace because it is only during peace that the state can assert its identity and serve the public interest.

Tribal militia and peace-making:
The flask and the monster thesis

In discussing the relationship between state and society, it is argued by Held (1983, p.35-6) that,

"The state maintains compliance or order within a given territory which involves a defence of life, property and the well being of its citizens....The state web of agencies and institutions finds ultimate sanctions in the claim to the monopoly of coercion and a political order is only in the last instance, vulnerable to crisis when this monopoly erodes. In other words the state is based on a monopoly of coercion which is legitimized by a belief in the justification and/or legality of this monopoly". The Sudanese state is therefore expected to be the main monopolizer of the use of force and not to delegate it to tribal entities with old enmities and rivalries. Many tribal groups both in the South and the North have resorted to such values and spontaneously formed groups of armed men to protect them. This point has at least three implications as to the conduct of the Sudanese state and the war in Southern Sudan:

i. Although the very nature of the state is based, among other considerations, on the use of force as a means to maintain its integrity and sovereignty, there is no reason whatsoever to delegate the use of force to tribal groups. This as Held (op.cit.) argues, would certainly lead to crisis because it is an admission of its weakness and inability to execute its duties and obligations towards its citizens. Hence to realize such a view requires a very well vested Government tradition which transcends ethnic loyalties. This, unfortunately, has not been the case in the Sudan.

ii. The state perceives the use of arms by the SPLA/SPLM as an illegal act, even though it admits that there is a genuine cause and a serious problem to be solved. The difference is not in defining the magnitude of the problem but about how to solve it. If that is the case the next step is to look for ways and means to bring about peace and stop the war. However, what we are discussing here is not an isolated mutiny or a minor incident, we are dealing with a war which involved more people than those who ousted the defunct regime of Nimeiri. One would like to believe that what motivated the SPLA/SPLM to take up arms against the state are genuine grievances. But the use of the same arms against civilians in the South and the North is not justified.

Nevertheless, arms have already been used and many lives were lost. The problem now is whether to resign to the sound of reason and restore the unity of the country or let the suffering of the masses continue. Recognizing that there is a problem is not a solution in itself. A practical alternative should be taken to keep the country united and to save the lives of the millions who are made homeless and destitute.

iii. There is, however, the danger that a weak state could attract external influences and by then the solution to the problems of the country would be neither in the hands of the State nor the SPLA/SPLM. It seems within this context that the warrior tradition has not only been adhered to by the tribal groups, but also by the political elites who lack in tolerance despite the devastation caused by the war.

However, an immediate question is how to put the monster of the tribal militias back in the magician's flask from which it stormed amid an absence of reason?

The fear is that the various tribal militias which have no common ideology, may continue attacking each other or the government troops, if they rejected any future agreement between the SPLA/SPLM and the Government. The possibility that the tribal militias may change into bandits and disrupt the peaceful life of the peasants and pastoralists after peace is achieved is not remote.

There is also the possibility that the tribal militias of the large ethnic groups may demand separation in order to establish their own nation-states. Joseph Garang (1973, p.90) has already warned us that,

"Thus given democratic conditions, the large national groupings might develop into nations within the Sudan. At any rate it is impossible to forecast today how things will look after the next fifty years". The question remains whether the state is aware of any social system that governs the distribution of arms and their holders. Even if the answer is yes, how could the collection of arms from isolated tribal groups be managed? These questions will certainly lead to whether the tribal militias are to be part of the peace process or whether they are going to be neglected only to continue after peace is struck between the SPLA/SPLM and the Government.

It will be premature to pretend that this paper offers ready answers to any of the questions it raised. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the complexity of the issue which I presented here would be realized by the warring parties before it is too late: The various tribal militias, I believe, have the genesis of 'nationhood' and may contemplate the creation of their own independent states in the face of a weak state even if an agreement with the SPLA/SPLM is reached. This is a possibility that we should not exclude considering that we are dealing with a debilitated state which strives for the management of bare survival and the maintenance of the present unenviable status-quo.

The solution to the present political brawl in the Sudan lies with the creation of democratic conditions which allow all Sudanese nationalities to develop and interact freely and peacefully. History has already shown that any attempt by the state to suppress national aspirations would only delay their eruption into civil wars. This is mainly because each nationality has strong sentiments towards its culture, language and the welfare of its members. Unity in cultural, religious and linguistic diversity is the only way out from the recurrent political doldrums and turmoils. There is, therefore, the need for greater tolerance and magnanimity not only between Southern and Northern leadership, but also between the leaders of the various Southern nationalities.

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