From its inception as an independent state up to this day, Sudan has been afflicted with congenital deformity that has always threatened its viability as a single united country.
As a multi-national, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-lingual society, it continues to be at serious odds with its own realities.
The colonial legacy of peripheral development has placed all power firmly in the hands of a single group from among the country's numerous different nationalities. The ruling class is drawn from one nationality, that is, the Arabicised Sudanese who also profess Islam. This ruling class from this single nationality (which uses the name of the rest of their ethnic group who do not share their methods) has been, since 1956, controlling and monopolising all the vital state institutions such as the army officer corps, the civil service, security, foreign affairs, education, etc. For the past three decades of its political hegemony, the ruling class has not only consolidated the economic supremacy inherited from colonial rule, but has also systematically pursued with great vigour a policy that accentuates domestically and projects externally the image of an exclusively Arab and Islamic Sudan. In support of this endeavour the successive minority clique regimes in Khartoum have dangled the carrot and brandished the stick as a means of suppressing the identities, cultures and spiritual beliefs of the non-Arab nationalities.
In short, Sudan has come to be defined only in terms of the perceived identity and aspirations of the ruling clique.
Sudan's perilous maladjustment to its realities represents a time bomb that keeps ticking away as we desperately race against it to forestall the country's total disintegration.
The New Sudan as a concept, therefore, strives to establish a new cultural order in the country. It takes as its point of departure the notion that human beings, in any given society, have equal rights and obligations regardless of race, beliefs, colour, etc. The establishment of the new cultural order demands of necessity a radical restructuring of state power to establish genuine democracy and to follow a path of development that will lead to far-reaching social changes.
a) Resolutions of the nationality and religious questions
If Sudan is not to fall apart under the mounting pressure of the consequences entailed by the contradictions between its projected homogeneity as an Arab state and its reality as a multi-national state, the resolution of the Nationality and Religious questions within a secular democratic context becomes an issue of paramount importance and one of utmost urgency.
Ever since its emergence as a sovereign state in 1956, Sudan has had an exceptionally turbulent existence. Throughout the period between then and now an acrimonious political debate has been raging over the thorny issues of identity. Some Sudanese have sought and with a considerable degree of success to affix to Sudan the label of URUBA (Arabism) whereas others have tried but without much luck to have their country depicted as African. The former category cites language and culture as the basis for its conviction. Meanwhile, the latter group has had resource to the preponderance of the African element within Sudan's ethnic composition as the rationale behind the belief that Sudan should be designated African rather than Arab. However, it is significant to note that the two competing views have tended to ignore altogether that Sudan, like the rest of the other nations, is essentially a product of historical development. As such what it should and what it should not be emanates entirely from its own objective conditions and not from peoples' predilections.
It is a fact of history that cross-fertilization of civilizations has occurred in many different parts of the world and on such a scale that wholly new civilizations from which it is not feasible to separate the component factors from one another have been created. Perhaps the societies of Latin America most vividly illustrate this point which requires no elaboration.
Sudan is best seen in this light. Its African and Arab identity factors, their respective cultures in addition to Islam, Christianity and other traditional beliefs some of the citizens observe and practice, are influences that do not exist in isolation from each other. These are elements which over the ages have been inextricably interwoven into the fabric of our society. They are strands that have fused together to form an integral whole that cannot be represented or denoted by any one particular constituent element.
"URUBA" and Islam for that matter are part and parcel of Sudan's reality. This aspect of our reality is immutable.
The diverse nationalities making up Sudan can and will have to coalesce into a Sudanese Nation (National Formation) with its own distinct civilization and with the capacity to contribute in its own right to the enrichment of Human Civilization rather than merely serve as an appendage of other nations.
On the issue of Religion it is to be admitted in all sincerity that nothing short of strict secularism will do in Sudan. The ruling clique hardly makes secret of its resolve to transform the country into a theocratic state despite the utter rejection of such a malicious political scheme by the masses out of the conviction that in our conditions of diversity a system founded on religion is not only unwarranted but a sure recipe for disaster and eventual fragmentation. A United National Front that transcends the religious divide should be forged against the Islamization of Sudan. Apart from automatically negating the fundamental rights of non-Muslims and Islamic state would provide the edifice of sectarian rule with perpetuity by lending it the political, legal as well as moral legitimacy. It is from here that the need for concerted action against the introduction of any form of Islamic legislation arises.
b) Overhauling the power structure
Real democracy is incompatible with the monopoly of political power such as is the case in Sudan where power has been the prerogative of minority clique from the Arab nationality.
The awesome power of the Central Government has to be radically restructured in a fashion that:
ii) Ensures the devolution of authority on authentic autonomous regional
governments, whatever form these governments assume.
Past and present experimentation with decentralized government has proved a total sham. These projects have been eagerly put forward by opportunistic rulers as an ingenious device that creates only the illusion of power transfer. Meanwhile, all the real power is actually retained by Khartoum. It is hardly amazing that with the start of the May Regime Khartoum made a U-turn in policy and successive minority clique governments have since invariably reacted with enthusiasm to pleas by the oppressed masses for more control over their affairs through a federal system or any other similar arrangements. It is worth stressing that none of the formulas for autonomous rule per se is a panacea for Sudan's ailments, as long as its implementation would ultimately be entrusted to the ruling clique. The masses should never lose sight of this important fact. Otherwise they run the risk of being carried away by the strong appeal associated with certain political terminologies.
Federal Government is not a novel idea in Sudan. Even before the end of colonial rule it was already being contemplated as the best possible method for running a country as vast and diverse as Sudan.
The crux of the matter is not whether our country ought to be administered within a centralized or decentralized framework but rather who should be charged with the responsibility of operating the Central government among whose key duties is the transfer of a measure of its authority to the regions. Indeed, this is the basic question to be always borne in mind when dealing with such issues. What really matters is for all Sudanese without distinction to be able to exercise the right of administering their country at both the regional and central government levels from the base right up to the apex of the power structure. A situation where a particular nationality or ethnic group takes it upon itself to dispense rights to and determine the duties of the rest of the nationalities and thereby decide their destinies, is completely uncalled for and an uncondonable anomaly that requires speedy termination.
c) National liberation
This is a process that is indispensable to the emergence of the "New Sudan". Hence it is to be addressed concomitantly with the task of National Formation. Thirty-three years after independence, the Sudan economy still suffers from the ills of the colonial period with regard to its structure, exports and imports, etc.
Sudan is potentially one of the wealthiest countries on the face of the globe; but in reality it notoriously ranks among the worlds's poorest states. This is a sad paradox. The present state of backwardness, underdevelopment, dependency and rapid retrogression is capable of reversal so that the country is transformed into the great agro-industrial and industrial power it is poised to become on account of its immense and varied national resources in addition to its creative manpower.
Promotion of the interests of the ruling circles has meant the exploitation of the tapped resources for the sole benefit of an insignificant minority and to the detriment of the overwhelming majority of citizens. All types of economic activity, their level and the locations where they are sited are usually pre-determined by the narrow selfish interests of the sectarian rulers and their beneficiaries: As a consequence much of Sudan has played little more than a peripheral subservient role in economic development and our resources remain underutilized and development potential in general wholly untapped.
The plunder of our riches and the economic enslavement of the masses is the work of the local sectarian-based aristocracy acting in collusion with rapacious foreign business interests. This unholy alliance has perpetuated in the shape of Neo-Colonial domination the economic relations of dependency engendered by past colonial rule. This state of affairs is untenable and must be ended. A comprehensive socio-economic development strategy pivoted on a programme to eliminate disparities between the relatively developed centre and the underdeveloped regions could be devised as an ideal way to launch the country towards the desired progress and prosperity.
Overall, the New Sudan would call for new economic ties with the rest of the world, based on mutual benefit, reciprocal advantages and respect for the sovereignty of all states. On the other hand, taking the harsh present-day economic realities, the Sudan shares with other underdeveloped countries in their proper context, it would be meaningless or on our part to strive to solve our problems outside the broad framework of the effort to establish a New International Economic Order. Since our economic predicament has its roots in the dominant world socio-economic formation of the epoch attempts to radically change the situation at home should be coupled with a reasonable degree of contribution to the International endeavour to bring about a New International Economic Order.
d) The army
As part of the existent "political superstructure" the army of the present Sudan is perfectly consistent in all respects with the status quo. The officers corps in general and the top military brass in particular are almost entirely drawn from among the affluent and privileged ruling minority clique and the sections of society linked with it. The interests and aspiration of the military establishment's higher echelons are identical with the interests of the ruling clique and diametrically opposed to those of the army rank and file. From the foregoing analysis it is quite simple to deduce that the cardinal duty of the officers corps (the rank and file being immaterial) is to preserve the system with which their destiny is bound. Such an army would be grossly incongruent with the realities of the New Sudan.
As a state governed by the National Democratic Forces, the New Sudan would ill-afford the folly of maintaining an army which identifies with the old regime and which would lose no time if given the chance to nip the revolutionary process in the bud.
The New Sudan would require a new army consistent with its particularity. That army could be, as a first step, molded through a synthesis of the warring armies. Subsequently and as the New Sudan in formation develops, and in fulfilment of its new role, the army should have its doors wide open to accept on a voluntary basis any able-bodied Sudanese who would want to join.
e) Foreign policy
The New Sudan shall be expected to pursue a foreign policy based on genuine adherence to the principles of Non-Alignment.
Active participation in the effort to enhance global peace and stability through elimination of the menace of thermonuclear holocaust shall be a major foreign policy goal. It would be in the interest of the New Sudan in formation as a developing country to encourage disarmament so as to help create a situation in which vast sums of money being squandered on arms build-up by the developed world could partly be devoted to the betterment of the developing countries, whose own resources drained away by unfair trade practices and economic policies, are being invested in the international arms industry.
The above is only meant to be a brief outline of the main foreign policy features of the New Sudan. An elaborate exposition on the subject of foreign policy is beyond the scope of this work which seeks to concentrate on questions of National Formation.
Generally speaking, the army in underdeveloped countries has apparently always failed to resist the temptation to grab power. In this regard Sudan is no exception.
The military has meddled and will continue to meddle in politics. Its appetite for politics is a fact that has never been lost on the ruling clique which from day one moved to secure the army's backing by turning it into an elitist institution whose interests are inseparable from the fortunes of the rulers.
Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the army forms the backbone of the oppressive minority clique system in Khartoum.
A correct reading of the concrete historical conditions obtaining in Sudan from independence up to the present day reveals that the reinforcement of mass political action with some kind of armed resistance is indispensable if a climate enabling the masses to wrest power away from their oppressors is to be created. The experiences of October 1964 and March/April uprising of 1985 will serve to illustrate the point.
Our country has been oscillating between military dictatorships and pseudo-parliamentary democratic governments depending on the strength of the popular mass movement and the pressures exerted by armed separatist groups which as recently as the beginning of the present decade continued to plague Sudan. The increasing tendency of these two factors to induce change has been further underlined by the glorious March-April popular uprising of 1985, that erupted essentially as a product of the objective interaction of mass political action with the armed struggle.
In fact if the masses, the creators of the "Intifadha", had had at their disposal at that critical moment in the capital the requisite "armed instrument" for the assumption of power we would now be free of sectarian rule and well on the way to the "New Sudan".
The birth in 1983 of the SPLM/SPLA as a Politico-Military Organization furnished the Sudanese Revolutionary Struggle with the armed component required to confront the armed custodian of minority clique rule.
The gains of the revolutionary armed struggle which have shaken the system to its very foundation eloquently speak for themselves and need not be mentioned. It suffices to note that the battlefield losses of the Nimeiri government and their economic ramifications did contribute significantly to the regime's eventual demise. Undoubtedly, developments of the past five and a half (5 1/2) years show that Khartoum is most vulnerable when it faces simultaneous opposition on both the political and military fronts. Hence, the combination in a conscious, deliberate way of mass political action with the armed struggle is absolutely essential to the triumph of the revolution in Sudan. The coalescence of all democratic forces into a single revolutionary tidal wave is what it will take to sweep away once and for all the bankrupt sectarian system in Khartoum. This can only be achieved if the mass political Movement and the Armed struggle converge.
Apparently the Revolutionary situation in the country has attained the peak of its maturity. This is so because the intensity of the present overall crisis indicates that Sudan can hardly become more ungovernable than it already is. The crisis has reached saturation point and the country is now ripe for the second and final Intifadha. This reality calls for joint efforts to make the subjective factors necessary to success prevail. Specifically a qualitatively higher level of political organization of the democratic forces and the broad masses is needed. In this sphere the formation of a broad-based National Democratic Alliance as a framework for fusion of the Armed struggle and the mass political action appears a matter worthy of consideration.
On the other hand, the position of the leadership of the National Democratic Movement vis-a-vis the socio-political power struggle leaves something to be desired. The progressive leadership in Sudan faces the challenge of overcoming divided loyalties. Intellectuals and top bureaucrats who predominate, across the entire Sudanese political spectrum, have their distinct socio-class interests to defend. Meanwhile, the progressive sections of this leadership are called upon at the same time to promote on behalf of the toiling masses aspirations directly opposed to their own.
Experiences of the World Revolutionary Movement generally tend to suggest that it is only in extremely rare cases that the oppressed masses have championed their own cause. In Sudan almost none of the popular-oriented political parties and organizations are led by personalities of a working class background.
Unless these leaders are prepared to renounce their social class and adopt as their own the class interests and aspirations of those whose struggles they spearhead, the Mass Movements in the country is likely to lack cohesion and force.
