ANNEXES:

Annex 9:

THE SPLM/SPLA'S POSITION ON THE PEACE PROCESS

August 4, 1988

I. Introduction

The central problems in the Sudanese war are: the dominance of one nationality over the others; the sectarian and religious bigotry that dominated the Sudanese political scene since independence; and the unequal development in the country. The Sudan is a multi-nationality and multi-religious country in which one of the nationalities is economically, politically and culturally dominant over the others. Since independence, power has been held by members of this nationality who arrogated to themselves the right to impose their religion on the country and to define all the other nationalities in terms of their narrow sectarian interests. As a result the country was plagued with discontent, instability and crises eventually erupting in open warfare. It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the present war has been imposed on the Sudanese people by bad Government in Khartoum which because of their myopic outlook have never taken the trouble to address themselves to the problems facing the country.

Permanent peace can and will come to the Sudan only when all sectors of Sudanese society appreciate the fact that the Sudan is a multi-nationality and multi-religious state, and all must work sincerely within the spirit and context of this reality. This necessitates a complete restructuring of the political power of the Central Government to the benefit of all the Sudanese people regardless of race, sex, ethnic background or religious belief.

II. The SPLM/SPLA quest for peace

1. On March 22, 1985, the SPLM/SPLA called for direct talks between the Sudanese Army in war zone 1 (South Sudan) and the SPLA while on the National level the Movement called for convening a NATIONAL CONGRESS to be attended by all political forces in the country to discuss the formation of a New Sudan with a new non-sectarian personality.

2. Following Nimeiri's fall, his Minister of Defence, General Sawar ed-Dahab, and his General Chiefs of Staff assumed power and formed the Transitional Military Council (TMC). The TMC and its civilian council of Ministers busied themselves with a massive disinformation and mystification campaign directed to whip up public opinion against the SPLM/SPLA. Thus, the Movement's call for a National Congress went unheeded by the Government of the Day. The first communication between the TMC and the SPLA was after 61 days from the date they assumed power and this was after the TMC had convinced itself that public opinion had been mobilized against the Movement.

3. The SPLM/SPLA's March 22, 1985 call for a National Congress was picked up by the National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS). A series of meetings took place between the SPLM/SPLA and the NANS, and these contacts culminated in the Koka Dam Conference. The four-day conference reached an agreement on how to approach the solution to Sudan's fundamental problems. That declaration became popularly known as the KOKA DAM DECLARATION. The declaration set out in detail the necessary pre-requisites for convening of a National Constitutional Conference and the agenda of that conference. The Koka Dam Declaration was a major watershed in the Sudanese genuine search for just peace. Concluded on March 24, 1986, the Koka Dam Declaration was signed and endorsed by the SPLM/SPLA, and except for the DUP and the NIF, by all the other Sudanese political parties, including the Prime Minister's Umma Party, and by all the major professional and Trade Union organizations. The Koka Dam Declaration provided, for the first time, a real basis for just peace. For the first time Sudan's political forces were serious and sincere about peace.

4. The leader of the Umma Party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, became Prime Minister three months after Koka Dam. He immediately started to campaign against the Koka Dam peace process to which he was signatory, and instead Sadiq started to talk about his own so-called Popular National Committee and to draft one meaningless Charter after another. All these one-man, one-party committees and charters cannot bring peace to the Sudanese people. On July 31. 1986 the leader of the Movement met Sadiq in Addis Ababa. The SPLM/SPLA side went into the meeting with an open mind and concrete proposals and alternative proposals of how to accelerate the peace process as stipulated by the Koka Dam Declaration. This seriousness on the Movement's side was met with persistent reluctance from Sadiq to commit himself to specifics. Indeed, Sadiq wanted to strike a deal between the Umma Party and the SPLM/SPLA. He was told that neither the SPLM/SPLA nor the Umma Party, nor indeed any other political force had the right to tamper with the Koka Dam Declaration. It was the work of all the Sudanese political forces and it is only they who can collectively amend it or throw it away if they so choose. This was the position of the SPLM/SPLA then and it is its position now.

5. Despite the many obstacles created by the de facto Government in Khartoum to abort the Koka Dam peace process, the Movement has never abandoned the search for peaceful resolution of the Sudanese conflict. Many other patriots, such as those in the Alliance have also worked day and night to bring about peace. In this endeavour the Movement met last year with a delegation of Sudanese Bishops to be followed by a series of meetings in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya with a delegation of the Sudan African Parties that was led by the Honorable Mr. Eliaba James Surur. Again in July 1988, the Movement met with a delegation of the Union of Sudan African Parties led by Dr. Andrew Wieu Riak. In all these meetings - with the Alliance, the Sudanese Bishops and the Sudan African Parties the necessity of the urgency for peaceful solution was underlined. Regrettably, the Prime Minister was angered by all these peace moves calling those who meet the SPLM/SPLA as traitors and 5th Columnists, threatening to take action against them. Despite the intimidation and harassment the Movement was able to meet all these parties and even the DUP and the NIF, the two parties that chose to absent themselves from Koka Dam.

6. On the international level, the Movement met and exchanged views with such respected leaders as the former Nigerian Head of State, General Olesugun Obasanjo, who tried his best at mediation and through whom the SPLM/SPLA conveyed specific proposals to the Prime Minister, but all to no avail.

III. The SPLM/SPLA's peace proposal

1. A declaration by all political forces and the Government of the day of their commitment to discuss the Basic Problems of the Sudan and not the so-called problem of Southern Sudan, and that shall be in accordance with the agenda agreed upon in this Declaration.

2. The lifting of the state of emergency.

3. Repeal of the "September 1983 Laws" and all others laws that are restrictive of freedoms.

4. Adoption of the 1956 Constitution as amended in 1964 with incorporation of "Regional Government" and all other such matters on which a consensus opinion of all the political forces shall be reached.

5. The abrogation of the military pacts concluded between Sudan and other countries and which impinge on Sudan's national sovereignty.

6. A continuous endeavour by the two sides to take the necessary steps and measures to effect a cease-fire.

Subsequent meetings of the Joint-Liaison Committee worked out the sequence of the implementation and realization of the above points as follows.

FIRSTLY, Points (1), (3), (4) and (5) to be implemented by the Government of the day;

SECONDLY, and after the realization of the above four points, the Government of the day lifts the state of emergency (Point 2) and the SPLA declares a cease-fire as the first step towards implementing point (6) the realization of which is the final step leading to the holding of the National Constitutional Conference.

These were the resolutions of the Koka Dam Declaration and the Joint-Liaison Committee. They are as pertinent today as when they were adopted as the blue-print to achieve peace in Sudan. The only obstacle standing in the way of Koka Dam and, hence, the convening of the National Constitutional Conference is the de facto Government in Khartoum, and more specifically, the de facto Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi. The Prime Minister has persistently refused to implement the pre-requisites stipulated in the Koka Dam Declaration as necessary for the convening of the National Constitutional Conference. The major argument of Sadiq is that the Declaration is not binding on the DUP and the NIF because they did not sign the Declaration. If the only argument against Koka Dam is that the DUP and the NIF were not signatories to the Declaration, and if otherwise the Government is genuine in wanting a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the SPLM/SPLA proposes the convening of another National Gathering, like the Koka Dam Conference, preliminary to the National Constitutional Conference. In this gathering all the Sudanese political forces will be represented including the DUP and the NIF that chose not to attend the Koka Dam Conference. This proposal entails strengthening the Koka Dam peace process by widening it to include all the political forces in the country.

ANNEXES:

Annex 10:

THE SUDANESE PEACE INITIATIVE

November 16, 1988

Preamble.

Committed to the unity of the people and territorial integrity of our country;

Rejecting the old policies that aim at escalating the war, destruction and deprivation in all forms, such policies that will ultimately lead to disunity;

Resolute in the necessity of persistent efforts to consolidate and enrich the democratic practice within the beloved Sudan;

Convinced that genuine peace in Sudan cannot be attained in the context of the so-called "Southern Problem" but on the appreciation that the problem is national in nature and hence, its resolution is only possible through a serious sincere and continuous dialogue among the Sudanese political forces on an equal basis in the proposed National Constitutional Conference;

Now therefore, the Sudan Peoples` Liberation Movement and the Sudan Peoples` Liberation Army SPLM/SPLA and the Democratic Unionist Party DUP, after frank and sincere discussions and exchange of views at this critical juncture in our country`s history, hereby agree to conclude this agreement.

A. Cognizant of the fact that the convening of the National Constitutional Conference is an urgent national necessity that demands of all the Sudanese political forces sincere and persistent efforts to bring about a conducive atmosphere for the convening of the conference, the two parties are totally convinced that the basic and necessary pre-requisites to create this conducive atmosphere are:
1. Although the firm stand of the SPLM/SPLA remains the repeal of the September 1983 Laws and to be replaced by the 1974 Laws, it nevertheless, and because of its keenness on the convening of the National Constitutional Conference had at this stage agreed with the DUP that in the period preceding the convening of the National Constitutional Conference all the provisions involving the "Hodoud" and related articles that are contained in the September 1983 Laws be frozen and that there shall be no legislation on any laws that contain such articles until National Constitutional Conference is held and final agreement is reached on the alternative laws.

2. The abrogation of the military pacts concluded between Sudan and other countries and which impinge on Sudan`s national sovereignty.

3. The lifting of the state of emergency.

4. Cease fire.

B. A national preparatory committee shall be convened to agree on the draft agenda, place and procedures of holding the National Constitutional Conference. The first meeting of this committee shall take place soon after its formation.

C. The two parties have agreed that the venue of the National Constitutional Conference shall be at a place agreed upon by the national preparatory committee where security is guaranteed to the satisfaction of all the parties concerned.

D. The two parties have agreed on the necessity of holding the National Constitutional Conference by 31st December 1988 provided that the prerequisites mentioned in this agreement would have been implemented to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

E. The two parties call upon all the Sudanese political forces to immediately join this sincere national effort so as to bring about peace and stability in our country.

Signed this day the 16th of November 1988 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

John G. de Mobior	           Mohamed Osman El Mirghani